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Condominium Owner Voting in Cambodia: Who Really Makes the Decisions?

Receiving the keys to an apartment rarely makes an owner think about voting. The swimming pool, security, service charge and appointment of the property manager can appear to belong to professional building management. The owner pays the bills and reports defects; everything else seems administrative.

Yet budgets, major repairs and house rules do not create themselves. Someone approves spending, selects the façade contractor, changes how common areas may be used, decides how short-term rentals are handled, appoints a manager and authorises a special assessment.

When an owner does not understand the procedure, effective control shifts to whoever attends meetings, holds a substantial share or controls the records.

In a Cambodian co-owned building, influence is not necessarily determined by the number of people or apartments. The basic model is built around co-ownership shares. A penthouse owner may therefore carry more voting weight than a studio owner, while a developer that still owns a large unsold inventory may outweigh dozens of individual investors.

The practical question is not simply whether meetings take place. It is who appears in the ownership register, how the shares are calculated, which threshold applies and what evidence proves that the resolution was validly adopted.

The internal regulations are the building's working constitution

Cambodia's Sub-Decree No. 126 provides for internal regulations governing a co-owned building. These rules should address the use of private units and common property, the rights and obligations of co-owners, the management structure, common expenditure and decision-making.

In day-to-day operation, the document functions as the building's working constitution. It should explain:

The model regulations attached to the Sub-Decree provide a starting point, but they do not answer every issue that arises in a modern international condominium. Each building needs a workable set of rules that is consistent with mandatory law and capable of being applied in practice.

Rules that owners cannot obtain, read or reconcile with the share register provide weak protection, however impressive their formal wording may appear.

Voting weight is commonly linked to shares, not simply to units

Many buyers expect one apartment to equal one vote. That is not necessarily how a co-owned building operates.

The approach under Sub-Decree No. 126 links the participation of a co-owner to their share, which is generally connected to the private unit and reflected in the relevant documentation. As a result:

Counting the people in the room is therefore insufficient. The meeting needs a reliable schedule showing each participant's share and the total base against which the required percentage is calculated.

Consider a meeting attended by ten owners. Nine of them together represent 20% of the shares, while one owner represents 15%. The nine may have a clear majority by headcount but only a modest majority by shares. In another building, two large owners may control most of the voting weight while representing a small minority of apartments.

An absolute majority is not merely a majority of those present

The model regulations associated with Sub-Decree No. 126 contemplate an absolute majority of co-owners for several significant matters, including certain amendments to the internal regulations, repairs or maintenance and questions concerning common-service payments.

In practical terms, an absolute majority usually means more than half of the entire relevant voting base, not merely more than half of those who attended.

If only 30% of the shares are represented at a meeting, a resolution supported by 20% may command two-thirds of the votes cast while still falling short of an absolute majority of all relevant shares.

The applicable calculation must be checked against mandatory provisions and the building's valid internal regulations. A requirement for an absolute majority should not be replaced casually with “half of those present plus one”.

Before voting, the administrator should also determine:

Demolition and reconstruction may require a higher threshold

The model framework provides for approval by at least 75% of co-owners for demolition and reconstruction of the building.

That threshold should not automatically be applied to every expensive repair. Replacing lift equipment, renewing façade sealant or repairing waterproofing is not necessarily a reconstruction of the entire building. Structural alteration, rebuilding after major destruction or a decision to demolish the property may be different.

The heading used in the budget does not determine the legal category. The analysis should consider:

Calling a reconstruction a “repair” to obtain a lower voting threshold creates a challenge risk. Requiring 75% for every routine replacement can be equally damaging by paralysing necessary maintenance.

Quorum and the decision threshold are different questions

Quorum asks whether enough voting interests are represented for the meeting to open and transact business.

The decision threshold asks how many votes are required to approve a particular resolution.

The internal regulations should deal separately with:

A risky arrangement is one in which a meeting representing 8% of the shares declares itself quorate and then approves major decisions by a simple majority of those present. Administrative convenience does not establish compliance with a mandatory threshold.

A reduced quorum for a reconvened meeting may allow discussion or ordinary business to proceed, but it does not necessarily reduce a statutory or mandatory majority required for the underlying decision.

An absent owner keeps both rights and obligations

Many Cambodian condominium investors live abroad and rarely attend in person. Their absence does not remove:

However, inactivity transfers practical influence to an active minority.

Imagine a building with 500 apartments. Three hundred owners live overseas, one hundred rarely respond, fifty units remain with the developer and only thirty local owners regularly attend meetings. Ownership is formally dispersed, but the agenda may be shaped by the manager, the developer and the small group that consistently participates.

This is not automatically improper. A building has to be run by someone. The concern arises when absent owners receive poor information and have no realistic way to participate or verify what was decided.

A proxy should be specific and verifiable

A proxy allows one person to vote on behalf of another. There is no single detailed form suitable for every Cambodian condominium, so the procedure depends on the internal regulations and the general law of representation.

The rules should clarify:

A blank proxy giving the representative complete discretion is convenient but offers the owner little protection. A meeting-specific proxy referring to the agenda and giving voting instructions is usually safer.

Conflicts of interest also matter. A property manager, contractor or developer representative may accumulate many proxies and then vote on their own appointment, remuneration or a connected contract. The building should disclose and control that situation rather than treating the proxy count as the only relevant fact.

Remote participation needs an auditable process

Videoconferencing and electronic voting may be indispensable in an internationally owned building. A poll in a chat group, however, is not automatically a valid decision-making process.

A credible remote system should provide:

Electronic participation is valuable only when it creates a dependable audit trail. An unverified messaging-app poll may reveal sentiment but may not prove the validity of a binding resolution.

Joint ownership needs one clear voting instruction

An apartment may belong to spouses, partners or a company with several participants. The building register needs to know who may act for that unit.

Joint owners should ideally establish:

If one joint owner votes in favour and another votes against, the manager should not choose whichever answer is more convenient. The internal regulations should state whether the vote is invalid, divided or requires a joint instruction.

Where the owner is a legal entity, current corporate records and evidence of the representative's authority should be available.

Unsold units give the developer real influence

A developer that still owns a substantial number of units may retain a large share of the vote. This can affect:

The developer's participation is not inherently improper if it remains a co-owner. The investment risk lies in opacity and unmanaged conflicts.

Owners should understand:

A resolution may satisfy the numerical threshold and still deserve heightened scrutiny where the main beneficiary also controls the agenda, the proxy collection and the count.

A signed sale contract does not always create an immediate vote

A completed project may simultaneously contain:

The commercial label “sold” does not necessarily identify the legally recognised co-owner for voting purposes.

The register used at a meeting should answer:

Without this discipline, one unit may vote twice through both developer and buyer, or may be excluded altogether.

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Arrears do not always remove voting rights automatically

It is understandable that paying owners may want to restrict chronic defaulters. A person who does not fund the building may still influence its budget. Yet any suspension of voting rights needs a clear legal and regulatory basis.

Sub-Decree No. 126 establishes the duty to contribute to common expenditure and provides consequences for non-payment in certain circumstances, but it should not be read as a universal automatic removal of voting rights for every overdue invoice.

The internal regulations may contain restrictions, but their validity and procedure need checking.

Two extremes should be avoided:

An undisputed overdue amount should be distinguished from a charge being challenged on reasonable grounds. The arrears register, notices and appeal procedure should be transparent.

Approving a budget does not authorise unlimited spending

Owners may approve an annual budget, after which the board and manager implement it within their delegated authority. The budget should nonetheless be sufficiently detailed.

It should normally identify:

A line reading “repairs — US$200,000” reveals little about the project, contractor or procurement process. The internal regulations may require separate approval, competitive quotations or a tender for major works.

The board need not call a general meeting for every light bulb, but it should spend money for the approved purpose and report against the budget.

Service-charge increases need both evidence and procedure

A substantial increase should not arrive as a brief message stating that the rate rises by 40% next month.

A stronger process includes:

  1. a realistic operating budget;
  2. an explanation of the increase;
  3. advance notice;
  4. access to supporting calculations;
  5. a meeting or other valid participation method;
  6. verification of the required threshold;
  7. proper minutes;
  8. correct billing;
  9. subsequent reporting.

The regulations should distinguish between the annual service charge, indexation, utility reimbursements, reserve contributions, a special assessment, emergency expenditure and a separate capital project.

Even an economically necessary increase can trigger conflict and non-payment when the procedure is unclear.

Short-term letting is a governance issue

Frequent short stays affect security, lifts, reception, insurance, noise, guest registration, utilities and the reputation of the building.

The manager may impose reasonable operational controls such as guest registration, access-card procedures, check-in hours, conduct rules and responsibility for misuse of common areas.

A complete prohibition or material restriction of private-unit use, however, should be tested against:

If a project was marketed for short-term letting and the owners later restrict it, the investment strategy changes. This does not make a restriction impossible, but the resolution needs a valid and documented foundation.

Changing a common area may require owner approval

Converting a children's room into an office, leasing part of the lobby to a retailer or permanently closing a pool is not always routine management.

The building should consider:

Temporary closure for repair is different from permanently removing an amenity from common use.

Conflicts of interest should be disclosed

A board member may be connected to a contractor, the developer to the management company, or a large owner to the tenant of a commercial space.

A sound process provides for:

The minutes should record more than the final percentage. They should show the voting base, attendees, proxies, agenda items, abstentions, disclosed conflicts and exact wording of each resolution.

Reconvening a meeting does not erase a mandatory threshold

Internal regulations may permit a second meeting when the first lacks quorum. Without such a mechanism, owner inactivity could halt basic management.

A reconvened meeting does not necessarily permit the building to bypass a threshold imposed by law or mandatory rules. The absence of owners cannot turn a 75% requirement for demolition or reconstruction into a simple majority of five attendees.

The building must record separately:

Confusing those two figures is a common source of disputes.

Emergency powers are limited by necessity

A failed fire pump cannot safely wait a month for the next meeting. The board or manager may need authority to act urgently.

Emergency expenditure should still be supported by:

A planned repair that has been postponed for two years should not be relabelled as an emergency merely to avoid scrutiny.

Chronic absence can paralyse the building

In an internationally owned condominium, many owners ignore notices. The consequences may include:

Participation can be improved through an accurate ownership register, multilingual notices, an annual meeting calendar, focused agendas, concise explanatory papers, valid proxies, auditable remote participation and professional board support.

Low engagement does not entitle the manager to replace owner governance with undisclosed private decisions. The procedure should be improved, not avoided.

Challenging a doubtful resolution

The model regulations contemplate an initial attempt to resolve a dispute through the board or executive body. If that fails, the matter may proceed to court or another applicable forum.

An owner questioning a vote should preserve:

Where implementation of an expensive contract may cause irreversible harm, the owner should obtain Cambodian legal advice before the work is completed rather than waiting for the loss to become permanent.

Example: how voting power may be distributed

Assume the shares are divided as follows:

If the developer and large investor vote together, their 55% may be sufficient for a matter requiring an absolute majority of all shares. They still do not reach 75% where that enhanced threshold applies.

The active individual owners cannot pass a resolution with 12%, but they can influence the agenda, identify connected transactions, gather proxies and help prevent an enhanced-majority proposal from passing.

This example shows why the number of people attending tells little about real control without the share schedule.

What a resale buyer should review

Before buying into an operating building, a purchaser should request:

Weak governance can affect value as much as the apartment's physical condition. A building with a transparent process can make difficult decisions. A building without a workable majority may postpone repairs for years while conflict and deterioration accumulate.

Conclusion

Voting in a Cambodian condominium is generally linked to co-ownership shares, not merely to the number of apartments or people in the room.

The internal regulations should explain notice, quorum, majority requirements, proxies, remote participation, the ownership register and minutes. Mandatory thresholds should not be diluted by informal convenience.

An overseas owner retains rights and obligations, but persistent inactivity transfers effective power to those who participate. A developer's unsold inventory may lawfully preserve significant influence, yet connected transactions and conflicts should be disclosed.

Good governance does not require a vote on every operational detail. It requires a clear division between ordinary delegated powers, major owner decisions and urgent protective action, followed by reliable reporting.

This article is for general information and is not legal advice. The validity of a particular resolution, voting threshold or management power should be checked against the registered building documents and the facts of the meeting.

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Sources

  1. Royal Government of Cambodia — Sub-Decree No. 126 on the Management and Use of Co-Owned Buildings.
  2. Royal Government of Cambodia — model internal regulations attached to Sub-Decree No. 126.
  3. Kingdom of Cambodia — Law on Providing Foreigners with Ownership Rights in Private Units of Co-Owned Buildings, 2010.
  4. EuroCham Cambodia — advocacy materials on practical condominium-management and service-charge collection issues.
  5. RICS — professional property-management principles, used as comparative guidance rather than mandatory Cambodian law.

Frequently asked

Does each apartment always have one vote?

No. The basic Cambodian co-ownership model links voting weight to each co-owner's share, which may reflect the size and registered value of the private unit rather than a simple one-unit-one-vote rule.

Can a small group make decisions for the whole building?

Only within the building's valid procedure and delegated powers. A majority of those attending does not replace an absolute or enhanced majority of all relevant shares when that higher threshold is required.

Can an overseas owner vote by proxy?

This may be possible if the proxy complies with the internal regulations and the applicable rules of representation. The form, scope and verification procedure should be confirmed before the meeting.

Does an owner in arrears automatically lose voting rights?

Not in every case. Any restriction requires a clear legal and regulatory basis, and a disputed charge should be distinguished from an undisputed overdue amount.

Can the property manager spend money urgently without a meeting?

Emergency authority may be necessary to protect life, safety or the building, but the expenditure should be limited, documented, reported to owners and included in subsequent financial accountability.