Owner Voting in Cambodian Condominiums: Who Really Makes the Decisions?
Receiving the keys does not usually make a condominium owner think about voting.
The pool, lifts, security, service charge and management contract may seem to belong to the professional management company. The owner expects to pay the invoices and report defects.
In reality, major expenditure and building rules do not appear by themselves.
Someone decides whether to:
- replace the lift contractor;
- increase the service charge;
- impose a special assessment;
- close or repurpose an amenity;
- allow short-term rentals;
- amend the internal regulations;
- appoint a new manager;
- approve facade or waterproofing works.
If an owner does not understand the procedure, decisions are made by those who attend, control a large block of units or hold the documents.
In a Cambodian co-owned building, practical power is not necessarily based on the number of people in the room. The basic framework connects decisions to the shares held by co-owners.
That can give:
- a large penthouse more weight than a studio;
- one owner of several apartments a significant block;
- a developer with unsold inventory more influence than dozens of small investors.
The central questions are therefore:
- Who is recognised as a co-owner?
- How are voting shares calculated?
- What majority is required?
- Who can prove that the resolution was validly adopted?
This article provides general information, not legal or property-management advice. Voting rights, quorum, proxy arrangements, owner status and decision thresholds must be checked under the title documents, internal regulations and applicable Cambodian law of the specific building.
The internal regulations are the building’s operating constitution
Sub-Decree No. 126 requires the developer to prepare internal regulations before private units are offered for sale or lease.
Those rules are intended to address the practical life of the building, including:
- rights and obligations of owners;
- boundaries between private and common property;
- allocation of expenses;
- management structure;
- decision-making;
- use of facilities;
- repairs;
- public services;
- disputes;
- liability.
The Sub-Decree provides a basic framework.
The detailed procedure for a modern building should be set out in the internal regulations of that specific project.
A well-drafted document should explain:
- who calls a meeting;
- notice period;
- agenda;
- owner register;
- share schedule;
- quorum;
- proxy rules;
- remote participation;
- voting forms;
- abstentions;
- minutes;
- conflicts of interest;
- recount or challenge procedure;
- emergency powers.
A weak set of rules may copy a general template without explaining how hundreds of overseas owners can participate in a high-rise building.
That gap can become serious only after a large repair or fee increase is proposed.
Voting power is linked to shares, not automatically one unit per vote
Sub-Decree No. 126 describes a lot as a private unit linked to the common areas.
The value of the lot is associated with the area of the private unit.
The sample internal regulations also indicate that decisions should be made on the basis of co-owners’ shares.
In practical terms, this can mean:
- a 30 m² studio carries a smaller share;
- a 90 m² three-bedroom carries a larger share;
- an owner of several units combines those shares;
- unsold developer inventory forms a large voting block.
A building should not be assumed to operate on a simple one apartment, one vote basis.
At the same time, floor area may not be the only practical input.
The actual voting calculation may depend on:
- approved lot schedule;
- strata plan;
- internal regulations;
- registered owner data;
- amendments;
- special allocation rules.
The buyer or owner should be able to reconcile:
- total private-unit area;
- unit share;
- total voting denominator;
- ownership register.
If management cannot produce a transparent share schedule, owners cannot properly verify voting results or the allocation of common expenses.
An absolute majority is not automatically a majority of attendees
The wording in Article 8 and the sample internal regulations is important.
For several categories, the framework refers to an absolute majority of all co-owners.
These categories include matters such as:
- amendment of the internal regulations;
- renovation;
- maintenance or repair;
- payment of public-service charges.
This is different from a simple majority of those present at a meeting.
Assume a building has 100% total shares.
Only 20% of the shares attend.
A vote of 15% in favour may be a majority of represented shares, but it is not an absolute majority of all co-owners.
The building still needs a practical way to manage routine work.
The sample rules also allow the general meeting to determine the authorised decision-making power of the management board where not every member is present.
That creates a distinction between:
- major owner decisions;
- delegated board decisions;
- routine manager authority;
- emergency action.
A manager should not need hundreds of signatures to replace a broken light fitting.
The same delegation should not be used to rewrite core rules or approve a major capital project without the required owner majority.
The 75% threshold is associated with demolition or reconstruction
The sample internal regulations provide a higher threshold for demolition or reconstruction of a deteriorated or unusable building.
A confirmatory vote of 75% of all co-owners is referenced.
Where that threshold cannot be reached, the building’s condition may be assessed by a competent authority and later considered through the court process.
The category should not be confused with every large repair.
Replacing:
- waterproofing;
- lifts;
- facade systems;
- pumps;
does not necessarily amount to demolition or reconstruction of the entire building.
A substantial structural rebuilding after severe damage may fall closer to that category.
The correct classification should depend on:
- technical scope;
- applicable law;
- internal regulations;
- effect on the building.
Calling a budget item reconstruction does not by itself determine the voting threshold.
Quorum and majority are separate questions
Quorum asks whether enough voting power is represented to open and conduct the meeting.
Majority asks how many votes are required to adopt a specific resolution.
The sample framework identifies several majority thresholds.
It does not supply a complete modern quorum table for every possible building and decision.
The internal regulations should therefore explain:
- initial quorum;
- reconvened meeting;
- treatment of abstentions;
- spoiled or invalid votes;
- late proxies;
- disputed ownership;
- jointly owned units;
- developer inventory;
- vacant units;
- owners in arrears;
- remote attendees.
A dangerous governance model allows a meeting representing a very small percentage of shares to declare itself valid and adopt important decisions by a simple majority of those present.
A reconvened meeting can be useful where owners are passive.
It should not be assumed to override a mandatory decision threshold.
A requirement for 75% does not become a simple majority merely because only five owners attended the second meeting.
An absent owner remains a co-owner
Many Cambodian condominium investors live abroad.
They may visit the property rarely and ignore most building emails.
Their absence does not remove:
- ownership share;
- obligation to contribute;
- right to receive notice;
- interest in the budget;
- exposure to the decision.
Practical power nevertheless moves towards active participants.
Consider a building with:
- 500 units;
- many overseas owners;
- a developer retaining 50 units;
- a small group of local owners attending regularly;
- management preparing the agenda and documents.
Formal ownership can be widely distributed while practical control sits with a small group.
That is not automatically manipulation.
A building must be managed by someone.
The governance risk arises where absent owners:
- do not receive notices;
- cannot appoint a proxy;
- cannot review documents;
- have no practical remote-voting method;
- learn of the decision only after the invoice arrives.
Proxy voting must be documented clearly
A proxy allows one person to act for another owner.
The basic Sub-Decree does not provide a single detailed proxy form for every building.
The internal regulations should clarify:
- whether the proxy must be written;
- whether an original is required;
- whether an electronic copy is accepted;
- whether notarisation is required;
- whether it is valid for one meeting or several;
- whether it covers all agenda items;
- whether voting instructions can be included;
- whether sub-proxy is permitted;
- how it can be revoked;
- how the signature is verified.
A blank proxy gives the representative broad discretion.
A specific proxy can state how the owner wishes to vote on each resolution.
Particular care is needed where proxies are collected by:
- the developer;
- the management company;
- a contractor;
- a board member with a commercial interest.
The representative may have a conflict of interest.
Online participation requires more than a video call
Remote participation is naturally useful in an internationally owned building.
A Zoom or Teams call alone does not establish a valid procedure.
The building should address:
- identity verification;
- ownership and share verification;
- secure meeting link;
- distribution of documents;
- voting tool;
- time zones;
- connection failure;
- translation;
- audit trail;
- preservation of the record;
- signed minutes.
Where the internal regulations do not provide for online participation, owners may need legal advice before relying on a remote vote for a binding special assessment or rule change.
An informal online discussion can help consultation.
It should not automatically be treated as a legally conclusive meeting.
Joint ownership of one unit requires one coherent representation
A private unit may belong to:
- spouses;
- several investors;
- heirs;
- a company;
- a trust or similar structure.
Management must know:
- who appears on the title;
- who is authorised to vote;
- whether the share can be divided;
- who receives notice;
- what happens when co-holders disagree;
- which corporate signatory is valid.
One lot should not accidentally vote twice because two names appear on the title.
A company-owned unit should act through a current authorised signatory or representative.
Expired or defective authority can later undermine the vote.
Developer inventory can determine the result
After handover, the developer may continue to own a large number of units.
Where it remains the recognised co-owner, those units may carry substantial voting weight.
The developer can have legitimate interests in:
- completing defects;
- maintaining the brand;
- selling remaining inventory;
- operating show units;
- managing future phases;
- keeping service charge commercially attractive;
- retaining a related management company.
Private owners may prioritise:
- independent management;
- adequate reserves;
- transparent procurement;
- stable resale value;
- fair rental competition.
The interests overlap in some areas and conflict in others.
Developer control can help during the early operating period.
The developer knows the systems and may subsidise costs.
Related-party decisions should nevertheless be transparent.
If owners are asked to approve a management contract with a developer-related company, they should receive:
- price;
- scope;
- duration;
- performance standards;
- alternatives;
- conflict disclosure.
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Contact usor on TelegramSales status and ownership status are not the same
A unit can be:
- unsold;
- reserved;
- under SPA;
- fully paid;
- handed over;
- title issued;
- cancelled;
- disputed;
- mortgaged.
For voting, the building must identify who is legally entitled to act as the co-owner.
A buyer with a signed SPA but no registered title may have a strong contractual and economic interest.
That does not necessarily give the same formal voting status as a registered co-owner.
Conversely, the developer may remain the registered title holder of units that buyers have already paid for and occupied.
The transition arrangements should explain:
- whether pre-title buyers can participate;
- who receives notices;
- whether the developer votes those shares;
- when the buyer enters the formal register.
Without a clear transition system, a developer can continue voting units economically funded by individual buyers.
Arrears do not automatically remove voting rights
Management may want to suspend voting rights of owners who do not pay service charges.
The idea appears fair.
An owner should not block the budget while refusing to fund the building.
Any voting restriction needs a clear legal and procedural basis.
Sub-Decree No. 126 imposes obligations to contribute to common expenses and refers to consequences for non-compliance.
It does not establish a universal automatic loss of voting rights for every overdue invoice.
The internal regulations may contain restrictions, but their validity and procedure should be checked.
Two extremes should be avoided:
- chronic non-payers paralysing necessary decisions;
- management declaring every owner disputing an invoice ineligible to vote.
A genuinely disputed charge should be distinguished from undisputed arrears.
Budget approval is not a blank cheque
An annual budget should identify:
- staff;
- utilities;
- security;
- cleaning;
- insurance;
- management fee;
- routine maintenance;
- reserve;
- major repairs;
- tax;
- contingency;
- developer subsidy;
- arrears assumptions.
A budget line stating only repairs — USD 200,000 gives little information.
A large project may require:
- separate approval;
- quotations;
- tender;
- technical report;
- conflict disclosure.
The board and manager need practical authority to execute an approved budget.
They should remain within the approved purpose and procurement rules.
Service-charge voting should be linked to a real budget
Maintenance and public-service costs change over time.
A building needs a procedure for:
- annual service charge;
- utility pass-through;
- inflation adjustment;
- reserve contribution;
- emergency spending;
- special assessment.
A stronger process includes:
- Draft budget.
- Explanation.
- Notice.
- Meeting.
- Vote.
- Minutes.
- Invoices.
- Reporting.
A message stating the fee increases by 40% next month may be economically necessary.
Without the proper process, it can create distrust and non-payment.
Short-term rental is a governance issue
Airbnb-style use affects more than one owner’s income.
It changes:
- security;
- reception;
- lift use;
- guest access;
- insurance;
- noise;
- common facilities;
- registration processes;
- building reputation.
Management may adopt operational rules.
A complete prohibition or major restriction on use should be assessed against:
- internal regulations;
- approved building use;
- owner rights;
- voting authority;
- adoption procedure.
An investor may purchase because the developer promotes short-term rental, only to find that owners later restrict it.
A residential community may also have legitimate reasons to prevent one floor from becoming a hotel operation.
The decision needs transparent classification and lawful voting rather than an informal receptionist policy.
Changes to common areas need the correct authority
Owners may wish to:
- lease roof space to a telecom company;
- convert a lounge into an office;
- install solar panels;
- close a play area;
- add a cafe;
- change parking access;
- extend the gym.
The proposal may be:
- maintenance;
- improvement;
- change of use;
- commercial lease;
- alteration of internal regulations;
- disposal of a common right.
The classification affects the required authority.
A manager should not grant long-term third-party rights over common property merely because it appears operationally convenient.
The board may also need owner approval.
Conflicts of interest should appear in the minutes
A board member can also be:
- contractor;
- broker;
- property manager;
- developer representative;
- bulk landlord;
- supplier.
That does not automatically disqualify the person.
The interest should be disclosed.
Good practice may include:
- recording the interest;
- presenting alternatives;
- checking market price;
- limiting participation in negotiations;
- recusal where required or permitted;
- keeping procurement records.
Minutes should show the process, not only the result.
Otherwise, an owner may later see a contract awarded to a board member’s company and assume misuse.
Minutes are evidence of the resolution
Useful minutes should record:
- date and location;
- notice compliance;
- attendees;
- proxies;
- shares represented;
- quorum;
- agenda;
- documents considered;
- votes for, against and abstaining;
- conflicts;
- exact resolution;
- effective date;
- responsible party;
- signatures;
- attachments.
The majority supported the proposal is not enough.
Where votes are weighted by shares, the percentage should be stated.
Where an absolute majority of all owners is required, the denominator must be visible.
Owners should receive the minutes within a reasonable time.
Emergency authority should be limited to necessity
A failed fire pump cannot wait for a meeting scheduled next month.
The manager or board should have emergency authority.
A defensible emergency decision includes:
- documented safety risk;
- defined scope;
- reasonable price;
- rapid procurement where possible;
- owner notice;
- later reporting or ratification;
- treatment of reserves;
- claim against the responsible party where appropriate.
The word emergency should not be used for a major repair that has been postponed for two years.
Emergency authority protects the building.
It does not eliminate accountability.
Persistent owner absence can paralyse the building
Low participation can lead to:
- unapproved budgets;
- no reserve;
- expired management contracts;
- delayed insurance;
- unsafe equipment;
- blocked special assessments;
- unresolved defects.
Possible improvements include:
- accurate owner register;
- bilingual notices;
- clear annual meeting calendar;
- proxy system;
- remote participation;
- concise agenda;
- advance technical explanations;
- delegation of routine operations;
- professional board support.
Low participation is not a valid reason to hide decisions.
The procedure should become easier to use, not less transparent.
Challenging a resolution
The sample internal regulations contemplate initial reconciliation of disputes through the management board or executive committee before escalation.
An owner challenging a vote should preserve:
- notice;
- agenda;
- internal regulations;
- ownership register;
- share schedule;
- proxies;
- minutes;
- calculation;
- resolution;
- invoices;
- conflict evidence.
Urgent legal advice may be required before a costly contract is implemented.
The appropriate forum and any interim measure depend on the specific dispute.
Governance review before buying a resale unit
A resale buyer should request:
- current internal regulations;
- amendments;
- unit voting share;
- management-board details;
- recent minutes;
- current budget;
- reserve policy;
- special assessments;
- disputes;
- developer voting share;
- proxy procedure;
- arrears policy;
- upcoming major resolutions.
A physically attractive apartment can sit inside a governance structure where the owner has little practical influence.
This is particularly important in a smaller building controlled by one bulk owner.
Worked voting example
Assume total voting shares equal 100%.
- Developer: 35%.
- Bulk landlord: 20%.
- Other private owners: 45%.
At the meeting:
- developer attends with 35%;
- bulk landlord attends with 20%;
- private owners represent 12%.
Total represented shares are 67%.
If the issue requires a simple majority of represented shares, the developer and bulk landlord control the result.
If the issue requires an absolute majority of all shares, their combined 55% may still be enough, depending on the rule.
If the issue requires 75%, additional private owners must participate.
The example is illustrative.
It shows why counting people can be misleading.
Two participants can control most of the voting power.
What a stronger governance system looks like
A stronger system usually has:
- accurate owner register;
- transparent share schedule;
- building-specific internal regulations;
- timely multilingual notices;
- reliable proxy procedure;
- remote participation;
- accessible minutes;
- clear division between board and manager;
- conflict disclosures;
- budget and reserve reporting;
- transparent developer transition;
- accessible records;
- defined dispute route.
It does not guarantee agreement.
It makes disagreement measurable and manageable.
Conclusion
Owner voting in a Cambodian co-owned building is not simply based on how many people attend the meeting.
Sub-Decree No. 126 requires internal regulations and a management board or executive committee.
The sample rules connect decisions to co-owner shares and refer to an absolute majority of all co-owners for matters such as amendments, maintenance, repairs and public-service charges.
A 75% threshold is referenced for demolition or reconstruction.
The basic framework does not provide one complete modern procedure for quorum, proxies and online participation in every building.
Those details must be addressed in the specific internal regulations and valid authorisations.
The main governance risks are:
- opaque share schedules;
- developer-controlled inventory;
- absent overseas owners;
- related-party contracts;
- minutes without percentages;
- unclear transition from SPA buyer to registered owner.
An owner protects the apartment not only by paying service charge.
They should know their share, receive the agenda, appoint a valid proxy where necessary, review the minutes and participate before the special assessment has already been approved.
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Find a propertyor on TelegramSources
- Royal Government of Cambodia — Sub-Decree No. 126 on the Management and Use of Co-Owned Buildings, 12 August 2009.
- Kingdom of Cambodia — Law on Providing Foreigners with Ownership Rights in Private Units of Co-Owned Buildings, 24 May 2010.
- EuroCham Cambodia White Book — Board of Regulators in Co-Owned Properties.
- RICS — Property Agency and Management Principles, effective 1 January 2025, used as international best-practice context rather than mandatory Cambodian law.
Frequently asked
Do condominium owners vote by number of apartments or by floor area?
Sub-Decree No. 126 links decisions to the shares of co-owners, while the value of a lot is generally calculated by reference to the area of the private unit. The building’s internal regulations and ownership register should show the actual voting schedule.
What majority is required for repairs or changes to the internal regulations?
The sample internal regulations attached to Sub-Decree No. 126 refer to an absolute majority of all co-owners for amendments to the internal regulations, renovation, maintenance or repairs and payment of public-service charges.
What threshold applies to demolition or reconstruction?
The sample rules refer to a confirmatory vote of 75% of all co-owners. Where that threshold is not achieved, the condition of the building may be assessed by a competent authority before a court considers the next step.
Can a foreign owner vote from another country?
The basic rules do not provide one universal remote-voting system. Proxy voting, written resolutions and online participation depend on the building’s internal regulations, the form of authority and the procedure recognised for that building.
Can a developer control decisions through unsold apartments?
Where the developer remains the registered or otherwise legally recognised co-owner of a large share of private units, those units can carry substantial voting weight. The ownership register, titles, share schedule and conflict-of-interest rules should be reviewed.