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Cambodia economy and property: 2025 review

A connected review of 2025 using data released and revised by July 2026: growth, trade, FDI, remittances, tourism, banking and property.

Indicators and their vintage

Each figure keeps two dates: the period it measures and the date it was published. A 2025 result released in mid-2026 was not available at the end of 2025, and a forecast is never shown as an observed outcome.

IndicatorValuePeriodReleasedNote
Average inflation[1]2.5%202508.06.2026
International tourist arrivals[3]5,569,752; -16.9%202502.2026
Gross NPL ratio[2]8.9%202528.03.2026
Existing Phnom Penh condominium supply[4]63,334 units2025-H202.2026Knight Frank commercial estimate, not an official register.

What became known after the year ended

Much of the reliable 2025 picture became available not on 31 December, but during the first half of 2026. NBC released annual banking and external-sector reviews, the Ministry of Tourism published full-year arrival tables, and the World Bank updated the macro estimate [1][2][3]. This report therefore dates both the period and the release.

Even after those publications, GDP growth remains an estimate: the World Bank uses 5.3% and NBC 5.0% [1][2]. The difference is modest but methodologically important. We do not select the convenient number or present a preliminary estimate as final national accounts.

Property-year closure is slower still. An official price index exists, but no public complete register of project-level transactions, rents and vacancy is available.

Growth slowed, but sectors diverged

Current estimates of 5.0–5.3% imply a slowdown from 6.0% growth in 2024 [1][2]. Industry remained stronger than services and agriculture, so the aggregate does not describe incomes in tourism, factory employment and urban services equally.

Average inflation was 2.5% [1], but the annual rate conceals later shocks and did not predict the spring 2026 acceleration. For owners, 2025 was a year of moderate headline CPI with uneven movement in individual costs.

For property, this was not a uniform “market growth” year, but a combination of manufacturing activity, weak credit, pressure on parts of domestic demand and substantial completed supply.

External trade was strong but concentrated

Exports rose 17.2% to US$31.3 billion; imports rose 18.2% to almost US$34.0 billion [2]. GTF remained about half of exports, and the United States absorbed 40.7%. This supported manufacturing while preserving high exposure to one market and trade policy.

Tyre and bicycle exports showed diversification, while electrical parts declined [2]. Manufacturing was not monolithic. Housing effects depended on the location of new capacity and the workforce profile, not the national export total.

Strong shipments did not cancel weak domestic demand in some groups: import costs, debt and lost remittances distributed the benefits unevenly.

FDI rotated toward manufacturing

FDI reached US$5.1 billion. Manufacturing received US$3.5 billion and 68.1% of the total, while construction and real-estate FDI fell 32.4% [2]. “FDI increased” therefore does not mean more money entered apartments.

Manufacturing capital can support exports and jobs. Its housing effect arrives later and locally—after facilities open, workers are hired and household budgets form.

For development, weaker sector FDI reinforced the need to verify project-specific finance rather than rely on the national investment headline.

Tourism and remittances hit different demand channels

International arrivals fell 16.9% to 5.57 million [3], although air travel increased while land arrivals dropped sharply. The effect was geographically uneven and intensified after mid-year.

Remittances fell 23.6% to US$2.1 billion [2]. For families dependent on earnings in Thailand, that directly reduced available income, while worker returns increased labour supply.

The two shocks should not be combined into one generic “weak demand” measure. Tourism primarily affected accommodation and services; remittances affected household consumption and debt service.

Banks and property: weaker asset quality

The banking-system gross NPL ratio reached 8.9% [2]. Rising problem loans coincided with slow credit and property stress. The system retained capital and provisions, but required closer recognition of distressed assets.

The official residential property price index fell 3.8% year on year nationally in December [2]. Knight Frank estimated 63,334 existing condominium units in Phnom Penh in H2 [4]. The index and stock measure different things, but both matter for liquidity.

For buyers, project security, title issuance, developer inventory and actual occupancy remained central. The national NPL ratio does not replace those checks.

Public finances provided a buffer

The World Bank estimated a 0.6% of GDP fiscal surplus in 2025—the first since the pandemic [1]. Public debt remained around 26% of GDP. This provided room to respond to shocks but did not remove private-debt problems.

The property relevance is indirect through infrastructure, social support and macro stability. A sovereign buffer does not guarantee completion of a private project or cover a developer’s obligations.

Tax relief and special measures also require date- and condition-specific reading; an annual macro review does not replace transaction checks.

What was revised and what remained open

Growth remains represented by multiple estimates rather than one final number. Tourism totals and banking indicators became available only in 2026. A year cannot therefore be closed reliably from December news coverage.

No complete register of realised transactions, market rents, vacancy and completion of every project is published. Commercial estimates are useful but sample-based and should not be presented as administrative counts.

The review should be revised after final national accounts, new annual series or material source corrections. The prior version should retain its date rather than silently rewriting history.

What this means for a property buyer

2025 showed why GDP growth alone is insufficient for a buyer. Manufacturing and exports were strong, while tourism, remittances, credit and property were under pressure. An asset depends on the combination of audience, finance and supply.

A completed unit should be assessed through actual rent and building budget; a construction-stage unit through land, security, finance and sales. Macroeconomics supplies stress scenarios but does not replace due diligence.

The most honest year-end foundation is a set of labelled ranges and measures, not one statement that “the market rose” or “fell”.

What we do not know

Final official 2025 GDP growth may still be revised; current 5.0% and 5.3% estimates are retained separately [1][2].

No complete public condominium transaction and rent database exists, so a single realised return for the whole market cannot be calculated.

The Phnom Penh supply estimate is commercial rather than an official register and may use its own definition of completion [4].

Some consequences of 2025 events became visible only in 2026 data; they should not be treated retrospectively as facts known at the transaction date.

Frequently asked questions

Why is a 2025 review produced in 2026?

Because annual NBC, tourism and updated macro reports arrive after the period ends. An earlier review would rely on incomplete data.

Which growth estimate is correct: 5.0% or 5.3%?

Both are current estimates from different institutions and methods. Until a final series is available they should be shown separately with source and date.

Did strong exports support apartments?

Indirectly through jobs and foreign exchange, but the effect depended on industry, location and worker income. Weak remittances, credit and large supply constrained parts of demand.

Does a 3.8% index decline mean every apartment fell?

No. The index aggregates the market under its methodology. A specific unit depends on project, condition, floor, view, title and liquidity.

What was the main risk of the year?

There was no single risk. The important feature was the combination of external concentration, weaker remittances and tourism, rising NPLs and property stress.

When should this report be updated?

After final national accounts or a material revision to annual series. Corrections should be dated and described, not made silently.

Where this leads next

Sources

The sources cited on this page, numbered in order. Each one is named with its issuing body and release date, because a figure without a vintage cannot be checked for staleness. We do not publish outbound links — the document name and the institution are enough to find and verify it yourself.

  • [1] Cambodia Economic Update, June 2026: Navigating Shocks — World Bank — 08.06.2026
  • [2] Financial Stability Review 2025 — National Bank of Cambodia — 28.03.2026
  • [3] Tourism Statistics Report, December 2025 — Ministry of Tourism of Cambodia — 02.2026
  • [4] Cambodia Real Estate Highlights, H2 2025 — Knight Frank Cambodia — 02.2026

Apply this to a specific property

Tell us the project and the goal — we will say which of these numbers actually bears on that decision and what still has to be confirmed in the building’s own documents.

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Informational material based on public, dated sources. It is not a public offer and not individual investment, tax or legal advice, and no forecast here is a promise of price or yield. Figures carry the period and the release date of their source and may be revised by the issuing body. A decision on a specific property requires document, price and ownership-cost checks with an independent Cambodian lawyer.