Phnom Penh Condo Supply and Delivery Pipeline

As of 29 September 2026, fresh evidence supports active construction at a minimum of 15 condominium projects or independently tracked phases within Phnom Penh Capital. Twelve of those projects have a residential unit count that can be used without mixing in hotel rooms or other non-residential components, giving 5,988 confirmed condo units. Three active developments — UC88 Wyndham Garden BKK1, L Tower 3 and Morgan Central City — remain in the project count but not in the unit sum because their residential totals cannot be isolated or verified cleanly from current public material. The defensible headline is therefore “at least 5,988 confirmed residential units,” not an estimate padded with assumed values. It is a documented floor based on open sources, not a statutory census of every construction site in the capital.

The threshold for “active” matters. A sales launch, permit, booking campaign or ceremonial announcement does not by itself put a scheme into the construction total. The projects counted here have dated evidence of physical work such as piling, foundation activity, structural floors, MEP, façade, fit-out or late-stage completion work. That creates a deliberately broad construction spectrum: G.A.T.O Tower and L Tower 3 are at early site stages, while The Flora Suites, UC88 Wyndham Garden BKK1 and Diamond Bay Garden are much further advanced. Two developments can both be described as under construction while carrying very different delivery risk and remaining timelines.

Mixed-use schemes need another filter. G.A.T.O Tower publishes a breakdown that allows 472 residential residences to be separated from its hotel component, so only those 472 homes enter the condo total. UC88 is different: current portals publish overall project totals and describe a residential-plus-hotel mix, but the residential share is not consistently separable, so no apartment number is added. Morgan Central City has current evidence of site activity and a target completion period, yet its public project material does not provide a clean residential total suitable for this calculation. Treating an unknown as zero would understate the pipeline; treating a mixed-use headline as all condos would overstate it.

The 5,988-unit figure also says nothing about how many homes remain available to buy. Project capacity can include sold units, reserved units, developer-held stock and apartments that may never be offered for rent at the same time. A construction pipeline is not an inventory report, and it cannot be converted into vacancy or absorption without sales and occupancy data. The useful question is narrower: how much residential capacity is physically being created in projects with current construction evidence, and how much of that capacity can be placed on a credible delivery calendar.

For scale, Knight Frank reported 63,334 existing condominium units in Phnom Penh at the end of H2 2025, after 1,770 units completed during that half-year. That figure and the 5,988 units here measure different things: one is an existing-market stock estimate at an earlier date, while the other is a current project-level minimum for active construction, with completed buildings removed and unknown unit counts left unknown. The comparison is useful only as a sense check. For an individual buyer or owner, the citywide total becomes actionable once it is split by delivery window, district and the confidence behind each stated date.

Project counts include active schemes even when their residential unit total is unknown; the unit column sums only confirmed condo units. The period uses the current stated completion window, or handover where that is the only usable milestone. Cross-year conflicts are left in the unknown/conflicting bucket rather than forced into an artificial midpoint.

By confirmed residential unit count, two central khans account for almost two-thirds of the documented pipeline. Boeung Keng Kang contains six active projects and 1,999 confirmed units, or 33.4% of the 5,988 known units. Chamkarmon contains five projects and 1,789 units, another 29.9%. Together they represent 3,788 units, or 63.3% of the known total. That concentration is a description of where physical product is being built; it is not evidence that either district will be oversupplied, because the projects differ in price point, format, stage and target buyer.

Sen Sok ranks next by known volume with 1,190 units, but that entire number comes from a single scheme, Leedon Heights. The distinction between project count and unit count matters here: one large development can make a district look dominant on a unit chart without implying a broad wave of separate competing buildings. Toul Kork contributes 700 known units through Time Square 7, while Mean Chey contributes 310 through Kingston Royale. Russey Keo has an active project in Morgan Central City, but its residential total is not cleanly published, so the district is counted as one active project without assigning it a fictional zero-unit total. All 15 active projects have a usable khan classification.

The district aggregation follows administrative khans rather than marketing labels. That distinction is especially relevant around Boeung Tompun, Tonle Bassac and the edges of Chamkarmon, where portals may describe the same address with a neighbourhood name that is more familiar to buyers but not suitable for consistent citywide aggregation. Kingston Royale, for example, is tied to Boeung Tompun 1 and is treated here as Mean Chey even though some commercial listings use different area labels. Keeping one geographic layer prevents hundreds of units from moving between districts simply because a portal changes its taxonomy.

For a buyer, district-level supply is more useful than the citywide total, but it is still only a first filter. A BKK1 apartment does not compete equally with every new unit in Chamkarmon, and a large Sen Sok development is not a direct substitute for a smaller central-city project simply because both appear in the same delivery calendar. The practical comparison set is usually narrower: the same khan or nearby micro-market, a similar price and unit size, comparable building management and amenities, and a similar handover period. Once those characteristics diverge, a large citywide pipeline becomes less informative about the prospects of one specific apartment.

There is a second reason to keep project count beside unit count. A single large scheme can influence a district’s future stock and buyer choice, yet its planned capacity still does not tell us how many apartments will be listed for sale or rent at the same time. The district numbers are best read as a map of future physical competition. They show where more comparable product may appear and where one large project drives the statistic, without pretending to measure sales, vacancy or demand.

The district percentages use only the 5,988 units with a confirmed residential count. Morgan Central City in Russey Keo and UC88 in Boeung Keng Kang remain active projects but contribute no assumed units to the denominator. The 33.4% Boeung Keng Kang share, and the absence of a known unit total for Morgan, should therefore be read as shares of measurable residential capacity rather than a complete statement of every unit physically under construction.

Twelve of the 15 active projects have a current completion or handover period that is usable at year level, giving 80% coverage by project count. Coverage is weaker when measured by residential capacity: 4,098 of the 5,988 confirmed units, or 68.4%, sit in projects with a usable current period. Another 1,890 known units belong to schemes where the current date is either not reliably confirmed or where sources disagree at the calendar-year level. That unknown share is material; it is one reason the table should be read as a documented schedule of stated targets, not a promised delivery programme.

Time Square 9 shows why the milestone label matters. Current project material places construction completion in Q4 or December 2029, while a separate handover date falls in January 2030. Those dates do not automatically describe a delay; they can describe two different steps in the same delivery process. The project therefore sits in 2029 in the year-level completion table, while the later handover remains a separate fact. A buyer who cares about when the apartment can actually be occupied needs the handover milestone, not just a headline completion year.

J Tower 3 contains a more difficult conflict. The official project site gives December 2028 as scheduled completion and January 2029 as scheduled delivery, while the current IPS profile also gives Q4 2028 completion but lists handover in January 2030. The available public material does not establish whether the later date refers to a different contractual milestone, a changed schedule, or a portal field that has not been reconciled with the official page. The pipeline therefore uses 2028 for the building-completion bucket and flags the handover discrepancy instead of converting it into a claimed delay. For a specific purchase, the controlling question is what milestone and date appear in the buyer’s current contract.

Time Square 6 illustrates a smaller form of disagreement. IPS currently gives Q1 2027, while ERA material gives Q3 2027. At annual resolution both belong in 2027, and inventing a six-month “delay” would overstate what the evidence supports because the sources are not necessarily consecutive versions of the same official target. Time Square 7 is different because the disagreement crosses a year boundary: IPS shows Q4 2027, whereas a more recently updated realestate.com.kh profile shows 2028. Until the target is reconciled, placing the project in the unknown/conflicting bucket is more informative than choosing one source silently.

Some older dates can be shown to have become stale even when a replacement date is not yet available. The Flora Suites has an IPS profile updated in June 2026 that still displays 2025 and 90% progress, while a more recent realestate.com.kh profile shows 95% and a 2026 completion year; that is a visible year-level revision. Leedon Heights is more striking: several directories still label it as completed in 2024, yet the developer’s own August 2026 construction updates show superstructure work continuing around floors 32–33 across its towers. The old 2024 label is therefore not a usable current delivery date, but the absence of a reliable replacement does not justify calculating a precise delay. Leedon remains in the active pipeline with its current completion period marked unknown.

For an off-plan buyer, the city pipeline is most useful as context around the project’s own delivery window. If a building is due in 2028, the current documented calendar contains four active projects in that year and at least 1,370 residential units with known counts. Those are not automatically 1,370 direct competitors: some sit in different districts, price bands and product categories, and they may target different renters or owner-occupiers. The comparison becomes more meaningful once it is narrowed to nearby schemes with similar unit sizes, management standards and positioning. At that level, the pipeline can show whether a buyer is likely to face several fresh alternatives arriving around the same time.

For an owner of a completed apartment, the same information works on a different horizon. A sale or rental planned two or three years from now may take place beside newly delivered buildings that reset what buyers compare — layouts, common areas, parking, management, furnishing and payment terms. Boeung Keng Kang and Chamkarmon together account for 63.3% of the confirmed unit volume in this snapshot, but even within those two khans the developments are not one homogeneous product. The city data identifies where a deeper competitive review is worth doing; it does not generate a price forecast.

One of the most useful numbers is the unknown/conflicting bucket. It currently contains 1,890 confirmed residential units, more than the known unit total assigned to any single delivery year. Unknown is therefore not a residual formatting category. It measures how much future capacity cannot yet be placed confidently on the calendar. A new reliable date for one large scheme could materially reshape the year-by-year chart without any new project being launched or any additional unit being built. For the same reason, 2028 — currently the largest known year with 1,370 units — should not be described as the certain peak of actual completions.

The pipeline also reveals when one project dominates a district figure. Sen Sok contributes 1,190 confirmed units to the active total, but essentially all of that volume comes from Leedon Heights, whose current replacement completion date is not reliably established. Looking only at unit volume would exaggerate the number of separate competitive choices. Looking only at project count would do the opposite and understate the scale of a single large development. Keeping both measures visible avoids that distortion.

None of these figures is enough to infer future yield, price direction, vacancy or absorption. Those questions require transaction evidence, live availability, occupancy, rental listings and segmentation by comparable product. The construction pipeline answers a narrower but still useful set of questions: how much physical residential capacity is already being created, where it is concentrated, how much of it has a usable delivery period, and where public information remains materially uncertain. That is a solid first layer for evaluating a particular apartment, provided it is not substituted for project-specific due diligence or the buyer’s contract.

Annual buckets also hide timing within the year. A 700-unit project scheduled late in 2028 does not create the same market moment as several smaller buildings handing over progressively across the year. The year-level view is useful for a mobile-first overview, but buyers whose decision depends on a few months — for example, an intended move-in or resale immediately after handover — still need the project-specific quarter and milestone.